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Louisiana Criminal Procedure-
A Critical Appraisal
Dale E. Bennett*
Under the Crimes Act of 1805,' the rules of evidence, forms
of indictment and method of procedure for Louisiana's criminal
trials were governed by the highly technical rules of the common
law of England. This wholesale adoption of the English common
law for a predominantly French territory met with disfavor,
and it was not surprising that the Louisiana Constitution of 1812
contained a specific prohibition "that the Legislature shall never
adopt any system or code of laws by a general reference to the
said system or code .... -2 However, the damage had already
been done in the field of criminal procedure, and the Louisiana
lawyer was forced to resort to the confusing precedents and
obtuse distinctions of the English common law. Attempts to
improve the situation by subsequent legislation resulted in a
patchwork system of basic common law with statutory variations
superimposed thereon.
In 1928, after previous efforts at codification had proved
unavailing,' the Louisiana Legislature finally adopted a Code of
Criminal Procedure. In preparing the new code, the commis-
sioners had drawn heavily upon the then recently adopted codes
of California and Michigan. They also relied upon the 1910 projet
of the Marr Commission, and sought to integrate the best rules
found in the hodge-podge of existing Louisiana statutes and
case law. Unfortunately the new code did not completely cover
the field. In the preface to his annotated edition of the code,
St. Clair Adams, chairman of the Code Commission, significantly
states, "As a Code of Criminal Procedure, it does not embody
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Acts of 1805, C. 50, § 33.
2. La. Const. of 1812, Art. IV, § 11. This provision has been continued
substantially in every subsequent constitution. See La. Const. of 1921, Art.
III, § 18.
3. Previous projets for Codes of Criminal Procedure had been prepared
by Livingston in 1825, by the Thompson Commission in 1898, and by the
Marr Commission in 1910. All of these had failed of adoption, due largely
to constitutional obstacles to the enactment as single codes.
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all of the rules of pleading, practice and procedure that are
applicable to the trial of criminal cases. Many of these rules are
not embraced in the Code and will be found in the Revised
Statutes, in the Acts of the Legislature, in the common law, and
in the jurisprudence of the state."
Subsequent piece-meal, though well meaning, amendments
have confused rather than clarified the procedural pattern which
was intended by the 1928 draftsman. Some improvement was ef-
fected by the 1950 Revised Statutes when the reporter integrated
a considerable number of miscellaneous statutory provisions with
the Code of Criminal Procedure in Chapter I of Title 15. How-
ever, that work did not include policy changes and there are a
number of areas where the present rules are either inadequate,
illogical or obscure.4
In our appraisal of Louisiana's rules of criminal procedure
we must be cognizant of the dual and conflicting objectives which
they serve. They must carefully safeguard the rights of the
accused by affording him a full opportunity to establish his inno-
cence. At the same time they should not be so hyper-technical
as to provide loopholes through which the guilty may escape or
delay justice. To these ends the rules of criminal procedure must
simply and concisely spell out the basic elements of a fair trial,
but without imposing awkward requirements which may be
manipulated by astute defense counsel to delay and ultimately
thwart justice. To the extent that a rule of criminal procedure
meets those needs it should be cherished and preserved. To the
extent that it does not, it should be carefully and thoughtfully
re-examined.
PRESCRIPTION
The first problem concerns the one year prescription set out
in Article 8, which applies to all crimes except an enumerated
list of serious and aggravated offenses. This period of limitation
is bottomed on the idea that criminal charges must be filed with
reasonable promptness after the offense is known to the law
enforcement authorities, and that a person should not be sud-
denly charged with an offense at a time more than a year after
4. It should be noted that La. R.S. 1950, 15:0.2, declares that "In matters
of criminal procedure where there is no express law the common law rules
of procedure shall prevail." This was merely a restatement of the principle
found in Sections 976 and 2072 of the Revised Statutes of 1870, a provision
which was clearly effective at the time the 1950 Revision was enacted.
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its commission. Ample safeguards against misuse of this statute
of limitations are found in the provisions that the period runs
from the time the crime is known to the proper authorities, and
that prescription is interrupted by the filing of a prior charge or
by the fact that the accused has fled from justice. The writer is
somewhat at a loss as to the justification for a stated exception
which permits the conviction of an otherwise prescribed crime
where a non-prescribable offense is charged.5 For example, the
crime of manslaughter may have been prescribed, and yet the
accused could be convicted of manslaughter under a murder
indictment. It is submitted that this deprives the accused of the
protection from delayed prosecutions, which was contemplated
by the one year prescriptive period. Also, there is a possibility
that a district attorney who had delayed the prescribable charge
beyond the one year period might be able to persuade the grand
jury to open the door again through an indictment for a greater
and non-prescribable crime. The fact that the probability of such
misuse of the indictment is slight and would be almost negligible
under proper instructions to the grand jury does not justify the
insertion of this illogical proviso. The note of the commissioners
provides no explanation other than the general notation that its
source was a 1926 Louisiana statute.6
VENUE
Prior to 1942 the Louisiana courts had experienced consistent
difficulty in determining proper venue in cases where the various
elements of a crime were scattered over several parishes. In view
of the courts' adherence to the view that they must ascertain the
parish where the crime was committed, it was not surprising to
find that these numerous venue cases were replete in fictions and
artificial technicalities. Frequently the pattern of decision was
somewhat difficult to ascertain. 7 In 1942, the general venue
& e of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended so as to
provide for trial "in any parish where a substantial element of
the crime has been committed."8 This provision solved the venue
riddle in those cases where the component elements of a transi-
5. Article 8 provides that the one year prescription "shall not apply to
prosecution and conviction for a lesser offense under an Indictment or
information for murder, aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggra-
vated arson, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, or treason... .
6. La. Act 67 of 1926.
7. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 19394940 Term,
3 Louisiana Law Review 379 (1941).
8. La. Act 147 of 1942.
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tory crime were spread over a number of parishes. In a few in-
stances, however, there may still be uncertainty as to the physical
location of the offense. Thus Article 15 provides that the trial
may be held in either parish where a crime is committed on the
boundary line or within one hundred feet of the boundary line
of two parishes.9 Another situation which may still cause diffi-
culty is illustrated by the Illinois case of Watt v. People0 where
a homicide was committed on a train, but with uncertainty as to
which of two counties was the place of the attack and immediate
death of the victim. The Illinois court relied on special venue
provisions which authorized the trial in either county. Without
such special statutory assistance, Louisiana might treat the of-
fense as a continuing crime and subject to prosecution in any
parish through which the train was traveling. From a practical
standpoint such a result would be justifiable, since the crime was
committed on the moving train and had no special connection
with either of the parishes. From a strictly logical standpoint,
such a holding would appear highly artificial. Undoubtedly the
better solution is by legislation-that is, adoption of the special
venue provision found in the Model Code of Criminal Procedure.
This clause, already adopted by twenty states, declares that
"When an offense is committed in this state, on a railroad train
or car prosecuting its trip, the jurisdiction is in any county
through which the train or car passes in the course of its trip,
or in the county where the trip terminates."" Such a provision,
rephrased in accordance with Louisiana terminology and en-
larged to embrace crimes on vessels 2 and aircraft could serve a
very useful purpose in plugging up a possible technical loophole
in our venue laws.
The Model Code includes a special provision whereby the
offense is triable in either county when stolen goods stolen in
one county are carried into another.'3 Variations of this provi-
sion are found in most state codes of criminal procedure. A simi-
lar result has been achieved in Louisiana by court decision, on
the theory that the original theft continues as the goods are
carried from one parish into another. 4 While this "continuous
9. La. R.S. 1950, 15:15, specially authorized by La. Const. of 1921, Art.
I, § 9.
10. 126 Ill. 9, 18 N.E. 340 (1888).
11. A. L. I., Code of Crim. Proc. § 245, commentary (1930).
12. Id. at § 246 similarly covers crimes committed on boats and other
vessels.
13. Id. at § 248.
14. State v. McCoy, 42 La. Ann. 228, 7 So. 330 (1930). Cf. State v.'
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asportation" doctrine is strongly artificial in nature, it achieves
a very good practical result in permitting the thief to be tried
wherever he is apprehended with the stolen property. Possibly
an express statutory recognition of the rule would be more in
line with the treatment of other venue problems. Also the rule
might be enlarged to cover the receiver who carries the property
into another parish. 5
EXTRADITION
Interstate extradition of those charged with a crime, who
have fled from justice and are found in another state, is provided
for by federal constitutional 16 and statutory 1'7 authority. Imple-
menting state legislation has been uniformly adopted. The Lou-
isiana provisions, in common with those of many other states,
repeat the troublesome federal requirement that the person to
be extradited must be "a fugitive from justice."18 This operates
as a bar to extradition in cases where the offender was not physi-
cally in the state seeking extradition at the time of his crime,
and thus did not flee from justice in that state after committing
the offense. For example, in the much cited North Carolina case
of State v. Hall" a defendant, while in North Carolina, shot
across the state line and killed his victim in Tennessee. The
crime was committed in Tennessee where the fatal shot took
effect,,20 but the North Carolina court refused extradition on the
theory that the defendant had not committed a crime in Ten-
nessee and then "fled from justice after his crime." The Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act, which has been adopted by thirty-one
states, solves the problem by authorizing extradition by the
state of asylum in any case where the person is charged with a
crime in the demanding state.21 The constitutionality of such
enactments, which do not include the federal requirement that
the person extradited be a "fugitive from justice," has been sus-
Reonnals, 14 La. Ann. 278 (1859), where the court refuses to extend this
doctrine to jurisdiction between states and holds that Louisiana cannot
prosecute for a theft committed in Mississippi.
15. Such an extension would overrule State v. Ellerbe, 217 La. 639, 47
So. 2d %30 (1950), which refused to allow prosecution of the receiver in the
parish where he subsequently carried the goods.
16. U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, originating in the Articles of Confederation
of 1781.
17. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3182, originating in 1893.
18. Art. 160, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:160.
19. 115 N.C. 811, 20 S.E. 729 (1894).
20. Clark and Marshall, Crimes, § 512 (1952).
21. Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 6.
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tained on the ground that the broader state procedure is supple-
mental to, and not in conflict with, the federal legislation.'
Louisiana might well consider adoption of the more effective
procedures of the Uniform Extradition Act which also include a
very practical provision expressly authorizing the re-extradition
of a local offender who has been extradited to another state to
stand trial there.2 3 Uniformity is particularly desirable on a
matter such as extradition where full interstate cooperation is
essential.
JURY LISTS
A problem which has been pointed up by attempted 1952
legislation deals with the inadequacy of jury venires. The gen-
eral venire list of three hundred frequently proves inadequate
for a jury term with several twelve-man jury cases booked for
trial. The grand jury list of twenty names, due to the arduous
nature of the duties assumed and numerous excuses from serv-
ice, is also frequently insufficient. The petit jury list of thirty
names is always inadequate for a jury week where the trial of
a major offense with multiple offenders is set. While supple-
mental petit jury lists are authorized, there is no requirement
of publication and service of these lists of jurors on the defend-
ant. Act 158 of 1952 sought to alleviate these difficulties by giving
the court a discretionary power to order the jury commission to
prepare larger general venires and jury lists. It amended Article
179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure so as to authorize general
venire lists of from three hundred to six hundred names as the
judge might direct. Article 180 was amended so as to raise ap-
preciably the number of names on the grand jury list to not less
than fifty names nor more than seventy-five. As amended, Article
181 provides for a weekly petit jury list of from thirty to one
hundred names in the discretion of the judge. This statute was
enacted without opposition, but the amendments to Articles 179
and 180 were accidentally superseded by Act 303 of the same
session, which amended Articles 179 and 180 for the purpose of
specifically authorizing "typewritten" lists. This subsequent act,
which failed to include the important changes brought about by
the earlier amendment, was held to have superseded Act 158
insofar as it empowered the judge to provide larger general
22. Ex parte Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756 (S.D. Calif. 1948).
23. Uniform Crim. Extradition Act, § 5.
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venire and grand jury lists. 24 Fortunately, the authorization of
larger petit jury lists, which is probably the most significant of
the changes effected by Act 158, was not impliedly repealed by
Act 303. However, the problem of frequently inadequate general
venires and grand jury lists is still with us. A legislative remedy
such as that proposed in 1952 may well be the answer.
Another source of considerable difficulty and dissatisfaction
has been the requirement of Article 202 that objections to the
general venire or jury lists must be urged "before the expiration
of the third judicial day of the term for which said jury shall
have been drawn, or before entering trial of the case if it be
begun sooner; otherwise, all such objections shall be considered
as waived and shall not afterwards be urged or heard. ' ' ,2 5 This
article is apparently aimed at securing prompt objections to jury
venires and jury lists, but it presents a cure which is distinctly
worse than the situation which it purports to remedy. Insofar
as it relates to objections to the grand jury panel there is appar-
ent conflict with other articles which permit the filing of objec-
tions to the indictment at any time prior to the commencement
of the trial.2 6 As applied to the time for objecting to petit jury
venires, it states a rule which also frequently proves unworkable.
Undoubtedly the principal source of difficulty has arisen out of
the attempt to set out a single rule that would govern the time
for filing objections to the general venire and petit jury lists,
and that would also govern the time for objecting to the compo-
sition of the grand jury as a ground for quashing indictments.
In this regard it will be noted that challenges toi the petit jury
panel from which the trial jury is to be drawn, and challenges
to the grand jury panel as a ground for quashing the indictment,
are separately and distinctly treated in the Model Code of Crim-
inal Procedure.2"
THE GRAND JURY
The true scope of the grand jury's, investigation of crimes
can only be ascertained by the combined reading of two sep-
24. State v. St. Julian, 221 La. 1018, 61 So. 2d 464 (1952). See also Louisi-
ana Legislation of 1952, 13 Louisiana Law Review 21, 63 (1952), noted in 13
Louisiana Law Review 606 (1953).
25. La. R.S. 1950, 15:202. For a complete discussion of this provision
see Comment, 18 Tulane L. Rev. 462 (1944).
26. Articles 253, 284 and 287, discussed infra at p. 19 et seq.
27. A. L. I., Model Code of Crim. Proc. §§ 207 and 210 (2) (a) (1930),
dealing with challenges of the grand jury panel after indictment, and Sec-
tions 267L274 dealing with challenges to the petit jury panel.
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arately enacted statutory provisions. Article 209 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure states that the grand jury shall investigate
offenses called to its attention by the court or the district attorney.
An old 1870 provision, which was integrated into the 1950 Re-
vised Statutes as Article 209.1, further states that it is the duty
of the individual grand jurors to call attention to crimes of which
they have personal knowledge or information.28 A clearer and
much simpler pattern of the grand jury's accusatory authority
would be provided if Louisiana should adopt a simple statement
that "the grand jury shall inquire into every offense triable
within the parish and for which a charge has not already been
filed."29 It should make. no difference how the crime came to the
grand jury's attention. Legislative efforts are frequently made
in the various states to give grand juries general inquisitorial
powers. However, it appears that the redactors of the 1928 Code
followed a sound policy in refusing to establish the grand jury
as a censor of public morals, and generally limiting its duties to
the filing of specific criminal charges.3 0
JOINDER OF OFFENSES
One of the most serious deficiencies in our present criminal
procedures relates to the matter of joinder of offenses. Article
217 reads: "Except as otherwise provided under this title, no
indictment shall charge more than one crime ... ." The princi-
pal exception was found in Article 218 which had codified the
common law and general rule. It directed the joinder of charges
"when two or more crimes result from a single act, or from one
continuous unlawful transaction . . . ." This meant, for example,
that where an armed intruder robbed the inhabitants of the dwell-
ing burglarized, the charges would be brought in a single indict-
ment-count one for aggravated burglary, and count two for
armed robbery. The related charges thus joined would be deter-
mined by a single jury at a single trial, thus saving time and
eliminating much useless duplication of testimony. In State v.
Jacques,31 Article 218 was held unconstitutional insofar as it
28. Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1870, §§ 883, 884, 2140, 2141, 3964, 3965.
Now La. R.S. 1950, 15:209.1.
29. Accord: A.L.I., Model Code of Crim. Proc. § 132 (1930).
30. See explanation of Code by Commission, Dart's Code of Crim. Proc.
562 (1932).
31. 171 La. 994, 132 So. 657 (1931) where joinder of murder (unanimous
12 man verdict) and robbery (9 out of 12 verdict) was held to violate the
defendant's constitutional right to different types of jury verdicts for the
two offenses joined.
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directed the joinder of offenses triable by different types of
juries. As an aftermath of the Jacques decision, Article 218 was
repealed in 1932.32 This repeal was also motivated by an exag-
gerated fear that the test of "one continuous unlawful trans-
action" was too uncertain-an argument that is largely answered
by the fact that the federal courts have not experienced great
difficulty in their interpretation and application of a similar
joinder rule. The re-enactment of Article 218 would promote
both trial convenience and substantial justice, but certain factors
should be kept in mind. First, the joinder provision should be
expressly limited to crimes with the same mode of trial and ap-
peal, thus eliminating the type of unconstitutional joinder which
was set aside in the Jacques case. Second, the provision should
follow the federal and common law pattern, making joinder
permissive rather than mandatory23
CHALLENGING THE INDICTMENT
The method of challenging the validity of an indictment or
information, that is, by demurrer or motion to quash, is clearly
spelled out in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4 However, the
time for filing such preliminary pleas is confusingly stated in the
various codal provisions. Article 284 states that such objections
must be taken "before the arraignment." Article 287 declares that
the demurrer and motion to quash "must be filed, tried and
disposed of before trial on the merits." Even more latitude is
apparently contemplated by the declaration in Article 253 that
objections to the indictment must "be made prior to the com-
mencement of the trial or at such time thereafter as the court
in its discretion permit." In cases where the indictment is defec-
tive by reason of the illegal composition of the grand jury list,
added confusion is injected by Article 202.35 Ignoring the possible
complications of Article 202, certain fairly definite conclusions
emerge from a careful analysis of the above provisions. The
32. La. Act 153 of 1932.
33. Suggested Article 218. "When two or more crimes which are subject
to the same mode of trial and appeal are based on the same act or trans-
action, or on several acts or transactions connected together or constituting
parts of a common scheme or plan, they may be charged in the same indict-
ment with a separate count for each offense charged."
Accord: Federal Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 8(a) (1946). For a historical
discussion of this problem in Louisiana see Comment, 4 Louisiana Law
Review 127 (1941).
34. Arts. 284-286, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:284-
286:
35. Discussed supra pp. 16-17.
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defendant's unqualified right to file a demurrer or motion to
quash the indictment is controlled by Article 284 which directs
the filing of such motions before pleading to the merits at the
arraignment. After the accused has entered a plea to the merits
he may, in the discretion of the trial judge, withdraw that plea
to plead otherwise.3 6 In such cases Article 287 will generally con-
trol and the substituted motion to quash must be tried and dis-
posed of before the trial on the merits. While Article 253 author-
izes the judge to permit the filing of a motion to quash after the
trial is under way, such discretionary permission will seldom be
granted since the resulting mistrials are not favored.3 7
To the veteran criminal lawyer or trial judge, the above
pattern is fairly well set. However, the inexperienced lawyer or
judge is faced with a rather perplexing situation-as evidenced
by the fact that cases involving this matter are presented at
almost every term of the Supreme Court. A great deal of con-
fusion could be avoided by a very simple statement as to the
latest point at which objections to the indictment may be filed
as of right, and the latest point at which they may be permitted
within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Possibly a re-
phrasing and combination of Articles 284 and 287 would effect
such clarification. At any rate Article 202 should be eased out of
the picture in this regard.
Article 25338 is a cumbersomely phrased provision which is
primarily concerned with the amendment of indictments and
procedures incidental thereto. It also includes the misleading
statement ". . . nor shall any conviction be set aside or reversed
on account of any defect in form or substance of the indictment,
unless the objection to such indictment, specifically stating the
defect claimed, be made prior to the commencement of the trial,
or at such time thereafter as the court in its discretion permit."
36. Id. at Arts. 265 and 266. Where the defendant has a valid basis
for his motion to quash and the shift in plea was not a dilatory tactic, the
refusal to permit a change of pleas is reversible error. State v. Verdin,
192 La. 275, 187 So. 666 (1939).
37. Sometimes the indictment may be so defective that it would not
support a verdict as in State v. McDonald, 178 La. 612, 152 So. 308 (1934)
where the indictment omitted an element of the crime. In such a case
the trial judge would do well to allow the motion to quash, so that a new
trial may be instituted on a valid indictment. Here, however, experienced
defense counsel will seldom seek to quash the indictment-preferring to
go to trial with the assurance that any verdict rendered on the fatally
defective indictment will be subject to a motion in arrest of judgment as
in the McDonald case.
38. The sources of this provision are La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, §§ 1047,
1063 and 1064. Also Mich. Code of Crim. Proc., ch. VII, § 76.
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(Italics supplied.) In State v. McDonalds' the court sustained a
motion in arrest of judgment where the conviction was upon a
defective indictment which omitted an essential element of the
crime charged. No objection to the indictment had been raised
either prior to or during the trial. In so holding the court stressed
the fact that the motion in arrest, which lies for any "substantial
defect patent upon the face of the record,"40 would be rendered
negatory if prior objection must be raised. It is significant that
the above quoted language of Article 253 was not even mentioned,
and it would appear that the italicized words "or substance" have
been read out by judicial construction. Since Louisiana seems
wedded to the rule of the McDonald decision that no valid convic-
tion and sentence can be based on a substantially defective indict-
ment,41 it would avoid possible future confusion if the judicial
demise of the phrase "or substance" were to be given appropriate
legislative recognition. In support of the rule enunciated in the
McDonald decision, it should be noted that the American Law
Institute's Model Code of Criminal Procedure expressly states,
as one of the grounds for a motion in arrest of judgment-" (a)
that the indictment or information does not charge an offense. ' 2
The utility of the demurrer, as a method of challenging the
validity of an indictment, is open to question. The demurrer is
limited to "defects apparent upon the face of the indictment"
and does not embrace those defects which must be established
by outside evidence. -Since "defects apparent upon the face of
the indictment" may also be raised by the broader motion to
quash the indictment, the separate demurrer serves no useful
purpose. However, it frequently provides a trap for some un-
wary defense attorney who may fail to recognize the technical
limitations of the demurrer and use it to raise an objection re-
quiring a consideration of evidence alienude the record, which
objection should have been raised by the more comprehensive
motion to quash.' There is much merit in the procedure set out
in the Model Code of Criminal Procedure" wherein all prelimi-
39. Supra note 37.
40. Art. 517, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La R.S. 1950, 15:517.
41. State v. Pridgen, 187 La. 569, 175 So. 63 (1937).
42. A. L. I., Model Code of Crim. Proc. § 369 (1930).
43. Art. 286, La. Code of Crim, Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:286.
44. State v. Aenspacker, 130 La. 717, 58 So. 520 (1912) where a demurrer
was insufficient to question the validity of the proceedings in which the
perjury charged was alleged to have been committed. The proper remedy
would have been a motion to quash the indictment.
45. AL.I., Model Code of Crim. Proc. § 209 (1930).
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nary objections to the indictment are raised by a motion to
quash, and the obsolete demurrer is omitted.
THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY
The question of how to handle the insanity defense has
always been a source of difficulty. Prior to the 1928 code, Loui-
siana had followed the common law procedure whereby the de-
fense of insanity at the time of the crime, along with all other
defenses on the merits, could be raised under a general plea of
"not guilty." This commingling of the insanity issue with other
basic guilt issues would frequently result in serious jury confu-
sion. Under the heading of insanity proof, it was not uncommon
to introduce evidence of hardships in the defendant's life-
evidence which would otherwise be inadmissible. While this
evidence might fall short of establishing the purported insanity
defense, it might so cloud a sympathetic jury's perception of the
basic issues of criminal liability as to result in a compromise
verdict of a lesser degree of the crime, or in a "hung jury." On
the other side of the ledger, joint consideration of the pleas
might prejudice the defendant by forcing him to urge simultane-
ously the mutually inconsistent claims that he did not commit
the crime; but that if he did, he was not mentally responsible.
The Code of Criminal Procedure sought to avoid these diffi-
culties by establishing "insanity at the time of the crime" as a
separate defense to the merits which must be set up by a special
plea.4 6 It further directed that such defense "shall be filed, tried
and disposed of prior to any trial of the plea of not guilty, and
no evidence of insanity shall be admissible upon the trial of the
plea of not guilty. ' -7 In explaining this change the code commis-
sioners stated, "It is thought that the provisions on this subject
will result in determining the issue of insanity vel non before
the trial on the merits, thereby minimizing the abuses which
often arise from the use of the plea of insanity." 4
The new procedure contemplated separate trials and virtu-
ally required the impaneling of two juries. The first jury would
determine the insanity plea, that is, whether the defendant was
criminally responsible for his action. If they found him sane, a
second jury would be impaneled to determine whether he had
46. Art. 261, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:261.
47. Id. at Art. 267 (as originally adopted). Applied in State v. Toon,
172 La. 631, 135 So. 7 (1931).
48. Explanation of Code by Commission, Dart's Crim. Stat. 562 (1932).
[VOL. XiV
LOUISIANA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
committed the crime charged. This created a serious practical
problem in the smaller country parishes where jury venires were
barely adequate to provide one twelve man jury for sensational
murder or rape cases. In an effort to eliminate the necessity of
dual juries, a 1932 statute 49 deleted the provision requiring that
the insanity plea be tried and disposed of prior to trial of the
plea of "not guilty." However, no change was made in the article
listing insanity as a special plea,"° and the amendatory statute
provided no substitute for the procedure eliminated-it did not
specify when the plea of insanity was to be raised or how it was
to be handled. During the past twenty years the procedure has
become rather well set by judicial decision, but the results are
somewhat anomalous: If the defendant simply pleads "not
guilty," evidence of insanity at the time of the crime is inadmis-
sible;5 1 but if he pleads "not guilty by reason of insanity," the
door is wide open and all defenses may be urged simultaneously.
Evidence is then admissible to show that the defendant did not
commit the act, that he was justified as by self-defense, and that
he is not responsible by reason of insanity. Even where the
defendant wants it, he has no right to a separate trial on his
insanity plea.5 2
If it is desirable to keep the trial of the insanity plea sep-
arate from the general "not guilty" plea, a practical solution may
be found in the California procedure.53 California reverses the
order of trial and provides that where insanity is pleaded the
jury shall first determine if the defendant committed the crime
charged. Then, if the defendant is found to have committed the
crime, the jury passes upon the separate defense of insanity.
In this way a single jury can decide both issues, and its judg-
ment in deciding the initial question of guilt or innocence is not
colored by the insanity defense or evidence introduced there-
under.
If it is desirable to revert to the more expeditious common
49. La. Act 136 of 1932, amending Art. 267, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of
1928.
50. Art. 261, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:261.
51. State v. Eisenhardt. 185 La. 308, 169 So. 417 (1936); State v. Gunter,
208 La. 694, 23 So. 2d 305 (1945).
52. State v. Dowdy, 217 La. 773, 47 So. 2d 496 (1950), discussed 11 Louisi-
ana Law Review 246 (1951).
53. 11 Cal. Pen. Code § 1016 (Deering, 1937). This procedure does not
violate the "due process" provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Troche
v. California, 206 Cal. 35, 273 Pac. 767 (1928); appeal to United States
Supreme Court dismissed 280 U.S. 524 (1929).
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law procedure of trying the insanity plea along with other de-
fenses relating to guilt or innocence, then insanity should be
struck out as a separate plea under Article 261. In such case it
might be well to require specifically advance notice of the de-
fendant's intention to rely on insanity as a defense. This could
easily be accomplished by requiring the filing of such notice at
the arraignment, or at such later time prior to the beginning of
the trial as the judge in his discretion may permit.
Closely related to the above problem is the question of how
the question of sanity is to be investigated. Rather than to leave
the matter to be determined by a "battle of experts," where both
sides call high-powered psychiatrists as witnesses, a 1932 amend-
ment to the Code of Criminal Procedure1 provided for an exami-
nation and report by qualified mental experts appointed by the
court. The requirement of "qualified experts in mental diseases"
proved difficult to comply with in view of the then scarcity of
properly trained personnel. A 1944 amendment substituted a
lunacy commission composed of "disinterested physicians" whose
sole qualification was that they must have practiced medicine for
three years. The mandatory inclusion of the coroner, who usually
has no special training in the field of psychiatry and mental dis-
eases, did not serve to strengthen the commission. The result has
been that the lunacy commission's report has been entitled to
little weight, and the battle of paid experts (psychiatrists employ-
ed by the defense and the state) rages unabated.
In seeking to recapture lost ground in the matter of sanity
hearings, the Massachusetts procedure offers a very sound solu-
tion.55 In that state the law provides for a state sanity commis-
sion composed of trained psychiatrists. It is the duty of this com-
mission to examine in advance of trial all persons indicted for a
capital crime and others who appear likely to urge any form of
insanity plea as a defense. Such pre-trial examinations by a spe-
cially qualified board results in sanity reports which are prompt-
ly available and are entitled to serious consideration as unbiased
expert testimony. Considering the importance of a sound and
fair hearing on the question of defendant's mental condition, it
would appear that the cost of providing such a commission
54. La. Act 136 of 1932, amending Art. 267, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of1928. Similar provisions were found in Maine (Me. Rev. Stat. 1944, c. 23,§ 119), Colorado (Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935, c. 102) and Ohio (Page's Ohio Gen.
Code Ann. 1937, §§ 13440-2, 13441-1).
55. Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 123, § 100A.
[VOL. XIV
LOUISIANA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
would be money well spent. If the members were employed on
a fulltime basis, their extra time could be utilized in helping the
overworked staffs of our state mental institutions.
It has frequently and logically been suggested that where a
person is acquitted by reason of insanity at the time of the of-
fense he should be committed forthwith to an institution for
the criminally insane. Present procedures apparently entitle
the defendant to an immediate separate hearing on the question
of his present insanity. The constitutionality of a statutory pro-
vision for automatic commitment has not been passed on by the
United States Supreme Court. While state tribunals are in con-
flict on this point, a majority of the holdings support the view
that such a procedure is not a denial of due process of law.5 6
THE NOLLE PROSEQUI
Article 329 codified the existing Louisiana jurisprudence and
general common law rule when it stated that power to nolle
prosequi an indictment should be "subject to the sound discre-
tion and control of the district attorney, and in order to exercise
that power he shall not have to obtain the consent or permission
of the court.15 7 Such a rule puts tremendous power in the hands
of the district attorney, who may thus nullify the findings of the
grand jury. Actually this danger is largely conjectural, since
the force of public opinion and the district attorney's sense of
public responsibility will generally preclude such a summary
disposition of grand jury indictments. A fear that the prose-
cutor's discretion'may be abused led to the proposal in the
American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure that a
prosecution shall not be dismissed except by court order and for
good cause entered of record by a written statement. 58 Similarly,
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require "leave of court"
for the dismissal of an indictment by the United States Attor-
ney.5 9 There are a number of rather convincing arguments for
not limiting the district attorney's full discretionary power to
nolle prosequi indictments. ° Foremost of these are the facts that
the district attorney frequently operates with a staff which is
56. See annotation in 145 A.L.R. 892 (1943).
57. Adam's Annotated Code of Crim. Proc. of Louisiana 124 (1929).
58. A.L.I., Model Code of Crim. Proc. § 295 (1930). Accord: Missouri
Crime Survey 146-147, 370-371 (1926).
59. Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc. Rule 48(a).
60. See Note; 50 Yale L.J. 107, 110 (1940), and Orfleld, Criminal Proce-
dure 342 (1947).
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inadequate for the proper prosecution of all charges which may
be brought by an overactive grand jury, and that the district
attorney has the best opportunity to investigate and sift such
charges. Possibly the Minnesota Crime Commission suggestion
represents a proper compromise of the conflicting interests when
it recommended that whenever an indictment or information is
nolle prosequied a written record should be made of the reasons
therefor.61 There is, however, the possibility that the district
attorney will make purely perfunctory statements, such as
"insufficient evidence" or "witness missing."
RECUSATION OF TRIAL JUDGE
Article 303, which states the causes for recusation of the
trial judge, was rewritten when it was incorporated into the
1950 Revised Statutes. While the revision simplified, clarified
and slightly broadened the grounds stated, it did not purport
to supply a major deficiency in the article. The first and most
litigated ground, "his being interested in the cause," only covers
the situation where the judge has a personal interest or advan-
tage to be served through the defendant's conviction. It does
not apply to the case where the trial judge has evidenced a defi-
nite hostility for some other reason.62 Full protection of the
defendant's right to an impartial tribunal should appear to re-
quire the recusation of any hostile judge, regardless of whether
he has any pecuniary or personal axe to grind. In that regard,
the Model Code and Federal Rules both state this ground of re-
cusation to cover any case of "interest or prejudice. 6 3
JURY VERDICTS
The provisions as to jury verdicts, which are found in both
the Louisiana Constitution64 and the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, 5 appear somewhat illogical. In capital cases a unanimous
verdict of a twelve man jury is required. In other serious felony
cases a nine-out-of-twelve verdict is sufficient. However, in
quasi (relative) felony cases, tried by a five man jury, the
61. Minn. Crime Comm. Report 311 (1927). Accord: Rule 50 of Second
Prelim. Draft of Federal Rules of Crim. Proc.
62. State v. Laborde, 214 La. 644, 38 So. 2d 371 (1948); State v. Morgan,
142 La. 755, 77 So. 588 (1917).
63. A.L.I., Model Code of Crim. Proc., § 250 (1930). See Comment to
Section 250 for other statutes recognizing "personal bias or prejudice" as
a ground for recusal.
64. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 9, and Art. VII, §§ 41, 42.
65. Arts. 337-340, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:337-340.
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requirement of unanimity is again imposed. It would appear
that if a nine-out-of-twelve verdict would suffice for conviction
of a serious felony that a similar proportionate verdict should
be adequate in these lesser crimes. With that thought in mind
the Louisiana State Law Institute, in its projet for a new Con-
stitution, provided that the quasi-felony should be tried by an
eight man jury with six concurring in any verdict rendered. 6
This suggestion met some disapproval in the small parishes due
to the inconvenience and cost of securing eight man juries for
these lesser crimes. Possibly a more practical solution would
be to keep the present five man bobtail jury and provide that
a four-out-of-five verdict would be sufficient. Such a change
would eliminate many of the presently large number of mis-
trials. At the same time it can scarcely be urged that the de-
fendant's constitutional rights to a fair trial demand a unani-
mous verdict where he is charged with one of the lesser offenses.
In this regard, it is significant that in Orfield's recent treatise
on Criminal Procedure, abolition of the requirement of una-
nimity, and reduction of the size of the jury, are listed among
the chief jury reforms which have been proposed and adopted
in some jurisdictions.0 7 The American Law Institute's Model
Code provides that in non-capital felony cases "a verdict con-
curred in by five-sixths of the jurors . . .may be rendered. 68
A related question is raised by the well settled rule that
even the lesser responsive verdicts must be unanimous if a
capital offense is charged. For example, if the charge is murder
then a verdict of manslaughter, which would normally be re-
turned by nine-out-of-twelve jurors, must also be unanimous.
Since the purpose of the unanimity requirement is to make sure
that a man shall not be convicted of a crime carrying capital
punishment except by a unanimous verdict, it would appear
appropriate to authorize included verdicts of lesser crimes or
a verdict of "not guilty" by a nine-out-of-twelve vote. Again
the matter is being considered from the standpoint of avoiding
an unnecessary number of "hung juries" with resulting mistrials.
The recommendations concerning jury verdicts are matters
66. La. State Law Institute Projet of a Constitution for the State of
Louisiana, Art. VI, § 32 (1950).
67. Orfield, Criminal Procedure 412, 481-482 (1947).
68. A.L.I., Model Code of Crim. Proc. § 355 (1930). Accord: Recommen-
dation of Missouri Crime Survey 264, 366-367 (1926). Contra, Rule 31a of
Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc. continues the common law requirement of unani-
mity for all verdicts.
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which would require constitutional amendments as well as
changes in the appropriate sections of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
JURY SELECTION
The purpose of the voir dire examination of prospective
jurors is to secure fair and qualified persons for that important
function. One sometimes wonders whether this end is really
achieved by Louisiana's common law system of long and con-
fusing voir dire examinations, which often resolve themselves
into a battle of wits between defense counsel and the district
attorney.6 9 The federal system,70 wherein the trial judge plays
the leading role in jury selection, provides a much more expe-
ditious method, and yet, federal juries compare very favorably
with our state juries as to fairness and integrity. The Model
Code of Criminal Procedure also provides for examination of
prospective jurors by the trial judge, and for such supplemental
examination by either party as the court in its discretion may
permit.71 However, a majority of our states still adhere to the
old common law system. This question as to the best method of
jury selection is a debatable one which should be the subject
of thorough study and discussion.7 2
Any consideration of the process of jury selection would be
incomplete without a brief discussion of Article 353 which pur-
ports to state the prerequisites for reversal where the challenge
of a juror for cause has been improperly overruled. In that
article the draftsmen of the 1928 Code sought to restate existing
Louisiana jurisprudence. However, the language employed is
cumbersome and ambiguous, and the situation has not been
improved by the somewhat unfortunate holding of State v.
Breedlove.7 8 In that 'case the Supreme Court held that the de-
69. The recent case of State v. Oliphant, 220 La. 489, 56 So. 2d 846
(1952) discussed 13 Louisiana Law Review 333 (1953), presents our common
law system of voir dire examination at its worst. The line of questions
astutely propounded to the prospective jurors appeared calculated to con-
fuse them, rather than truly to ascertain whether they had formed a fixed
opinion of guilt.
70. Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 24(a).
71. A.L.I., Model Code of Crim. Proc. § 275 (1930).
72. From a mass of authoritative writing in point, the following are
suggested: Report to the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges of
the Commission on Selection of Jurors (1942); Blume, Jury Selection Ana-
lyzed, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 831 (1944); Grant, Methods of Jury Selection, 24 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 117 (1930); Otis, Selecting Federal Court Jurors, 29 A.B.A.
J. 19 (1943).
73. 199 La. 965, 7 So. 2d 221 (1942), discussed in 5 Louisiana Law Review
253 (1943).
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fendant could not claim reversible error unless he had done two
things. First, he must have exhausted his peremptory challenges
in the completion of the jury-a requirement expressly spelled
out in the first clause of Article 353. Second, he must have chal-
lenged an additional juror whom he was forced to keep, after his
peremptory challenges were exhausted. This must be done, accord-
ing to the court, in order to show that the error was "prejudicial
to substantial rights of the accused"4 and to meet the specific
requirement of the last clause of Article 353 by showing that
"the defendant by such ruling is forced to accept an obnoxious
juror." There was much common sense in the late Chief Justice
O'Niell's dissent. He stated that a sufficient presumption of
injury is established by the fact that defense counsel has ex-
hausted his peremptory challenges in impaneling the jury,
without imposing the additional requirement that he must chal-
lenge and thus prejudice a subsequent juror whom he is ulti-
mately forced to keep. The Breedlove decision, although ren-
dered by a divided court (4 to 3), appears justified by the lan-
guage of Article 353. The remedy is a legislative one, and clari-
fication of the language and effect of this article is much to be
desired.
THE OPENING STATEIVIENT
The district attorney's opening statement "explaining the
nature of the charge and the evidence by which he expects to
establish the same"7 5 is mandatory in Louisiana, and its omis-
sion is ground for reversal if timely objection is made. 6 The pur-
pose and scope of this opening statement has been a much liti-
gated question. A few Louisiana cases have followed the general-
ly accepted rule that the statement has no binding force and is
made "to enable the jury to understand and appreciate the testi-
mony as it falls from the lips of the witnesses."77 There is a ten-
dency in the Louisiana jurisprudence, however, to treat the open-
ing statement as a device to protect the defendant from surprise
by forcing the state to "show its hand" in advance of trial.7 8 Under
74. Art. 557, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:557.
75. Id. at Art. 333.
76. State v. Ducre, 173 La. 438, 137 So. 745 (1931).
77. State v. Sharbino, 194 La. 709, 194 So. 756 (1940) noted in 3 Louisiana
Law Review 238 (1940); Orfleld, Criminal Procedure 356 (1947) states that
the function of the opening statement is "to assist the jury in arriving at
the truth."
78. State v. Ducre, 173 La. 438, 137 So. 745 (1931); State v. Shearer, 174
La. 142, 140 So. 4 (1932).
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this theory evidence not mentioned in the opening statement is
inadmissible 7 9 and a troublesome problem is posed as to how
detailed the opening statement must be. These difficulties are
without corresponding benefits for there is no real need for requir-
ing such a preview of the state's case. The defendant is amply
protected from prejudicial surprise by his right to a bill of par-
ticulars and to a continuance in appropriate cases. In view of
the unsettled state of our jurisprudence, a specific legislative
statement may be the only way to place the district attorney's
opening statement in its proper focus-as an aid to the jury,
rather than a technical limitation on the proof to be adduced
at the trial.
DIRECTED VERDICTS
A device giving the judge added control over the trial is
the federal motion for judgment of acquittal" and the provi-
sion for a directed verdict of acquittal in the Model Code.81 In
cases where the prosecution's evidence has failed to establish
a prima facie case of guilt, the directed verdict of acquittal saves
the defendant from further harassment and expense. Further-
more, it is to the interest of the state to prevent additional pro-
longment of a clearly futile trial. The advantages of the judg-
ment or directed verdict of acquittal after the evidence of both
sides is concluded are much less substantial. In such cases there
is no great benefit to be secured by the trial judge's taking
over the jury's function and ordering an acquittal. Ample pro-
tection from a prosecution-happy jury is provided by the motion
for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is contrary to
the law and the evidence. ' 's2
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide
any form of directed verdict of acquittal. Thus, even an ob-
viously unfounded prosecution must drag on to the bitter end,
unless the district attorney chooses to nolle prosequi the charge.
A 1950 statute 3 provides partial relief, in cases tried before
79. State v. Silsby, 176 La. 727, 146 So. 684 (1933); State v. Garrity, 178
La. 541, 152 So. 77 (1934); State v. Ward, 187 La. 585, 175 So. 69 (1937).
80. Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 29(a).
81. A.L.I., Model Code of Crim. Proc. § 321 (1930).
82. Art. 509 (1), La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:509(1).
In State v. Daspit, 167 La. 53, 118 So. 690 (1928), the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that it was the "duty" of a trial judge to determine the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict of guilty.
83. La. Act 447 of 1950; La. R.S. Supp. 1950, 15:402.1.
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the judge alone, by a motion for acquittal after the state's evi-
dence is completed. No form of directed verdict is available,
however, in cases tried before a jury. It is true that motions
for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the state's evidence
are seldom well founded,14 for it is not the usual practice for
a district attorney to bring a case to trial with evidence insuffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case. Yet, the device should be
available for those situations where it is needed to protect the
accused from unnecessary prolongation of unfounded charges.
SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE
The 1942 amendment of the articles governing suspension
of sentence in misdemeanor cases made little improvement in
the law.8 5 A provision which would have permitted the imposi-
tion of conditions by the court was deleted by the House Com-
mittee, and the offender is still released "during his good be-
havior" which simply means "until he is convicted of another
crime." While it might not be financially practical to set up a
sufficiently extensive probation system to provide supervision
for misdemeanants with suspended sentences, the imposition of
reasonably enforceable conditions would be far preferable to
a completely unregulated release. The specific authority to sus-
pend sentence after the prisoner has begun to serve enables the
trial judge to grant necessary relief in cases where the prisoner
becomes critically ill during his incarceration or is desperately
needed in a family emergency. However, the full beneficial
effect of this provision is somewhat diminished by the Supreme
Court's ruling that the suspension must be for the entire re-
mainder of the term to be served.8 There are temporary emer-
gency situations where a partial suspension of sentence may
serve a very useful purpose and the law should be clarified so
as to permit such relief.8 7
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
The motion for a new trial "must be filed and disposed of
84. Missouri Crime Survey 175 (1926); ". . . out of the total number of4,969 felony cases in the circuit courts, during the period of the survey,
only 18 were dismissed owing to the failure of the state to make out a prima
facie case."
85. La. Act 48 of 1942, amending and re-enacting Arts. 536-538, La Code
of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
86. Cox v. Brown, 211 La. 235, 29 So. 2d 776 (1947).87. See the Work of the La. Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term, 13Louisiana Law Review 342 (1953).
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before sentence." s A minimum time of twenty-four hours must
elapse between verdict and sentence,8 9 and it is the usual prac-
tice to sentence the defendant within a few days after convic-
tion.90 This period is adequate for the preparation and filing of
the motion for a new trial, except in those cases where the
motion is based on newly discovered evidence. Frequently the
evidence, despite reasonable diligence of defense counsel, is not
discovered until after sentence. In such cases it appears to be the
generally accepted practice to disregard the mandatory language
of the code, by permitting the motion to be filed at such later
time as the new and material evidence is discovered. 91 Rather
than to relegate this important matter to the judicial recog-
nition of an implied exception to a flatly stated rule, the Federal
Rules provide a special two-year period for the filing of a
motion for a new trial on this ground.
9 2
The remedy, when a motion for a new trial is granted on
the ground that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evi-
dence,93 is to set aside the verdict with a resulting trial de novo
of the case.9 4 Sometimes the achievement of practical justice
is not that simple. The trial judge may be convinced that the
defendant is not guilty of the crime of which he was convicted,
but is still clearly guilty of a lesser and included offense. For
example, a defendant may have been convicted of murder in
a case where the killing was in the heat of passion caused by
adequate provocation. In such a case the appropriate relief
88. Art. 505, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. Supp. 1951,
15:505.
89. Id. at Art. 521.
90. Under Article 531 the judge may postpone the imposition of sentence
"for a period not exceeding sixty days" to secure information relating to
the advisability of placing the offender on probation.
91. The motion must affirmatively show "that notwithstanding the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence, the evidence was not known before or during'
the trial, but has been discovered since." Id. at Art. 511. see also Article
512 and State v. Saba, 203 La. 881, 14 So. 2d 751 (1943) applying this require-
ment.
92. Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 33. The prior federal rule (by juris-
prudence) had required that such motion be made within the term of court.
United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55 (1914).
93. Art. 509(1), La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. 1950, 15:509(1).
94. Id. at Art. 515. Louisiana has adopted the probable minority view
that a defendant who secures a new trial, after having been convicted of
a lesser degree of the crime charged, does not give up the benefit of the
implied acquittal of the greater offense. State v. Harville, 171 La. 256, 130
So. 348 (1930). However, Section 368 of the Institute's Model Code ex-
pressly provides that on re-trial "the defendant may be convicted of any
offense charged in the indictment or information, irrespective of the verdict
or finding on the former trial." Many jurisdictions uphold the validity of
such convictions, see Note, 23 Tulane L. Rev. 575 (1949).
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should be a reduction of the judgment to manslaughter, rather
than a complete reversal-yet no such practical solution is avail-
able to the reviewing court.9 In this regard a 1927 California
statute furnishes a very logical solution. It provides that if the
evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of the degree of
the crime of which he was convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree
of the crime, the trial court may modify the judgment accord-
ingly without granting or ordering a new trial 6 Such a pro-
cedure achieves complete justice and also eliminates the burden
of unnecessary re-trials.
EXCEPTIONAL REMEDIES FOR IMPROPER CONVICTIONS
Where the impropriety or irregularity of a conviction is
not realized until the defendant is already serving his sentence,
the normal remedies of the motion for a new trial or in arrest
are unavailable. Such motions must be filed between verdict
and sentence. Where there was a lack of jurisdiction ratione
materiae extraordinary relief may be secured through a writ
of habeas corpus filed with the district court. Such relief was
granted in State ex rel. Duhon v. General Manager, Louisiana
State Penitentiary," where the defendant had been convicted of
a non-existent crime. Similarly a writ of habeas corpus would
be appropriate where a juvenile was convicted and sentenced
for the crime, of burglary, since the criminal district court has
no jurisdiction to try a juvenile for non-capital crimes. A pos-
sible hiatus in our procedure lies, however, in the case where
there was clearly jurisdiction ratione materiae, but where the
conviction or guilty plea had resulted from gross irregularities
or a serious mistake as to the law. Such a situation could occur
in a case where the jurisprudence at the time of the conviction
indicated liability, but a subsequent Supreme Court decision in
another case recognized a defense which might have been raised
had it not been assumed invalid. Again, a miscarriage of justice
might occur by reason of irregular procedures at the trial-
as where a defendant charged with murder pleaded guilty in
order to go to the state penitentiary and escape threatened mob
violence. In this type of case the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed
the granting of relief through the little used common law writ
95. State v. Howard, 19 Kan. 507 (1878); State v. Symes, 17 Wash. 596,
50 Pac. 487 (1897). Orfield, Criminal Procedure 510 (1947).
96. Cal. Stats. 1927, p. 1037, amending Cal. Penal Code § 1181. Applied
with approval in People v. Kelly, 208 Cal. 387, 281 Pac. 609 (1929).
97. Noted in 9 Louisiana Law Review 413 (1949).
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of error coram nobisY8 Probably this form of relief would be
available in Louisiana, since the common law rules of procedure
prevail in matters where the statutory law is silent.99 Again,
it may be that the applicant for relief may be relegated to some
less certain type of relief such as appealing to the discretionary
supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Here is an
important right of the defendant which should be clearly spelled
out and a definite procedure provided rather than to leave the
remedy for such mistaken convictions to conjecture and some-
what dependent upon super-astuteness of defense counsel. Sev-
eral legislative solutions suggest themselves. An expanded and
modernized version of the writ of error coram nobis might be
added to the review procedures in the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure. The arbitrary time limitations on the motions for a new
trial and in arrest of judgment might be removed. The legis-
lature might point the way (although it could not direct effec-
tively) to such relief through the Supreme Court's supervisory
jurisdiction. At any rate, here is a matter which should not be
handled "by main force and awkwardness" in our state courts,
possibly resulting in situations calling for collateral intervention
through the federal writ of habeas corpus.10 0
In this article the writer has briefly raised some of the
more serious deficiencies and incongruities found in the 1928
Code of Criminal Procedure in its present much-amended form.
Some of the basic procedures followed have been compared
with their differing counterparts in the Federal Rules and in the
Model Code of Criminal Procedure. Suggested amendments are
sometimes offered-not with the idea that the suggestion pre-
sents the solution of the problem, but rather to indicate one of
the ways in which the procedure might be improved. A number
of lesser problems have been omitted, and the important chapter
on rules of evidence is completely untouched.10 Suffice it to
point out that the provisions of this chapter have been a pro-
lific source of Supreme Court jurisprudence, and that many of
the rules stated therein should be carefully appraised as to their
practicality, fairness and clarity. Each change, whether enacted
piece-meal, or through a complete revision of the code, will re-
98. Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. Rep. 29 (1882).
99. La. R.S. 1950, 15:0.2, source Section 33 of the Crimes Act of 1805.
100. Dobie, Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts, 13 Va. L. Rev. 433
(1927). Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25
B.U.L. Rev. 26 (1945).
101. La. R.S. 1950, 15:422-497.
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quire a certain amount of re-adjustment to the new procedure,
as was the case after the adoption of the code in 1928. Such
is the price of all progress in the law. Experienced practitioners
must stand ready to give up their vested advantage in a knowl-
edge of the confusing complexities of the present system, in
order that the entire bar may benefit from new and simplified
procedures. Suggested changes must be appraised in the light
of dual, and somewhat conflicting considerations-fairness to
the accused and trial expediency. Procedures should not be
altered for the sake of change alone or without sound reason.
Yet, where a rule is clearly out-moded, a century of habitual
error should not establish a vested right for its continuance.
Unfortunately the wheels of progress move rather slowly in this
sometimes neglected, yet very important, area of adjective law.
